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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, politicians and citizen action groups have
aggressively deployed direct democratic procedures in order to repeal state
and municipal legislation benefiting minorities. The federal courts have
been tentative in their constitutional review of these repeals. Direct
1. Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying minimal equal protection
scrutiny to Amendment 2, an anti-gay amendment to the Colorado Constitution), and Valeria G.
v. Wilson, 12 F. Supp. 2d 1007 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (denying a preliminary injunction to stay the
enforcement of Proposition 227, an anti-bilingual education amendment to the California
Education Code), with Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (applying strict scrutiny to
Amendment 2 under equal protection), and Ruiz v. Hull. 957 P.2d 984 (Ariz. 1998) (ruling
unconstitutional Amendment XXVIII to the Arizona Constitution. which required state
subdivisions to conduct all official business in English). Federal courts have been similarly
tentative in other cases. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona. 520 U.S. 43 (1997)
(refusing to rule on the constitutionality of Amendment XXVII1 because the case was moot and
the state courts had not yet had an opportunity to interpret the law); Coalition for Econ. Equity v.
Wilson, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997) (denying a preliminary injunction to stay the enforcement of
Proposition 209, a state constitutional amendment prohibiting racial and gender preferences at all
levels of California government); Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) [Equality Foundation 1] (upholding the denial of a preliminary injunction
to stay the enforcement of Article XII, an anti-gay amendment to the Cincinnati city charter),
vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), affid on remand. 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997) [Equality
Foundation 11], reh'g denied, 1998 WL 101701 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) [Equality Foundation 1111,
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 365 (1998).
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democracy has been called the "most democratic of procedures,"' under
the view that the purest form of democratic governance is strict
majoritarianism, or ruling by numbers. However, the laws reviewed in these
cases do more than merely repeal minority protections. They also
restructure the political processes of state and local governments in such a
way as to impose special burdens upon the interests of minority groups who
must seek beneficial legislation at ever higher and more remote levels of
government. Three decades ago, the Supreme Court effectively applied
strict scrutiny to alterations of state and municipal political processes
intended to repeal fair housing laws and to foreclose the future enactment of
policies benefiting racial minorities.3 Recent decisions, however, have made
the status of this precedent uncertain.
This Note will examine political restructuring jurisprudence under the
Equal Protection Clause, focusing especially upon the Supreme Court's
ruling in Romer v. Evans. The Romer Court held unconstitutional an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution (Amendment 2) adopted through a
statewide referendum, prohibiting any branch of the state government or
any subordinate governmental agency from taking action designed to
protect persons on the basis of their homosexual or bisexual orientation.
The Court refused to determine whether heightened scrutiny was
appropriate to review the anti-gay amendment at issue, holding instead that
Amendment 2 was unconstitutional even under the most permissive level of
judicial scrutiny. The Court furthermore proclaimed an alternative per se
rule under which "[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government
is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense."'
2. Romer, 517 U.S. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Additionally, some political theorists have
praised direct democracy as a means of revitalizing democratic politics by, for example, breaking
the stranglehold of entrenched parties on the political process, decreasing the influence of special
interests, and inviting laypersons to participate in policymaking. See JAMES S. FISHKIN, TIl.
VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: PUBLIC OPINION AND DEMOCRACY 174-75 (1995) (arguing that the
introduction of deliberative polling at various levels of American democracy would have the
galvanizing effect of promoting considerate citizen participation in public affairs). STEVEN D.
LYDENBERG, COUNCIL ON ECONOMIC PRIORITIES, BANKROLLING BALLOTS UPDATE 1980: TIE
ROLE OF BUSINESS IN FINANCING BALLOT QUESTION CAMPAIGNS 13 (1981) ("The initiative
process was established specifically to counteract influences which special interests have over the
legislative process."); Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1347. 1357
(1985) (reviewing DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984)) (stating that direct democracy opens opportunities
for shaping policy agendas to groups that are not "regular players in the game of legislation").
But see MAGLEBY, supra, at 196-99 (concluding that direct democracy neither increases voter
participation nor rescues public policymaking from distortion by special interest groups);
Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLFi 17. 18
(1996-1997) (arguing that "special interests, not ordinary citizens, generally form the terms of the
debate concerning ballot measures").
3. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
4. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
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Under normal equal protection analysis, heightened scrutiny is
triggered upon the use of a suspect classification or the infringement of a
fundamental interest.5 Sexual orientation, however, has not been designated
as a suspect classification.6 The Romer Court extended protection against
disadvantageous political restructuring to gays and lesbians both without a
finding of suspect classification and without invoking the doctrinal
apparatus established in the racial restructuring cases. The majority opinion
in Romer exposes the Court's present inclination to ration the judicial tools
of heightened scrutiny and suspect classification in cases in which it might
be requested to extend their application to minorities not traditionally
5. The Court has articulated a limited set of fundamental interests that may trigger strict
scrutiny under equal protection. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right to
unrestrained travel across state lines); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (the right to vote).
However, the level of judicial scrutiny applied to a particular state action is generally determined
by the classification used. Racial classifications draw "'the most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), requiring the governmental defendant to demonstrate
that its action is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. regardless of
whether the action was intended to benefit the racial groups so classified. See Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to race-based affirmative
action). Gender classifications draw intermediate scrutiny, requiring the state to show that the
classification "serves important government objectives and is ... substantially related to... those
objectives." United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (internal quotation omitted).
Classifications that are not considered suspect draw the lowest level of scrutiny, rational basis
review. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to grant
heightened scrutiny to protect the mentally ill because mental illness is not a suspect
classification); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and tie Equal
Protection Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 127 ("The Equal Protection Clause is directed at the
legality of classifications.").
In contrast, the political restructuring cases are not strictly classification-based, but appear to
infer classification from the fact that a political burden has been placed squarely upon the
shoulders of a specific minority. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. 458 U.S. 457,
485 (1982) ("[W]hen the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address
racially conscious legislation--and only such legislation-is singled out for peculiar and
disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly 'rests on distinctions based on race.'-
(citation omitted)); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (" [A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and
white, Jew and gentile in an identical manner, the reality is that the law's impact falls on the
minority."); see also Gregory Ellis, Note, Rethinking the Hunter Doctrine. 8 S. CAL,. INTRtilsc.
LJ. 323, 333-34 (1998) (arguing that Hunter and its progeny invalidated laws that were facially
neutral but nevertheless found their racial impact relevant to the application of heightened
scrutiny); cf. Reirman, 387 U.S. at 381 (stating that a facially neutral state constitutional
amendment protecting property rights "was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial
discrimination in the housing market").
6. While the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the issue, several circuits have denied
suspect-class status to gays and lesbians. See, e.g., Equality Foundation 11. 128 F.3d at 293 & n.2:
Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1997); Jantz v. Muci. 976
F.2d 623, 629 (10th Cir. 1992); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989). But see
Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brennan. J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (indicating that homosexuals might deserve suspect-class status because they
"constitute a significant and insular minority of this country's population" and are "particularly
powerless to pursue their rights openly in the public arena"); Watkins v. United States Army, 837
F.2d 1428, 1444-48 (9th Cir.) (concluding that homosexuals constitute a suspect class because
they exhibit immutability of their distinctive social trait, political powerless, and a history of
discrimination and prejudice), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988). vacated and aff'd on
other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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construed as politically powerless and therefore deserving of special
judicial protection.7
The political restructuring cases, however, hold a special place in equal
protection jurisprudence: They characteristically involve acts of higher
lawmaking8 damaging to the interests of a particular social minority. 9 These
are cases in which acts of state discrimination not only reflect pre-existing
political powerlessness, but also actively contribute to conditions of
powerlessness. In Romer, the Court embraced the possibility that the
Constitution might intervene in democratic politics when acts of political
7. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 28 (1973) (identifying as
suspect classifications those groups "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian process"); see also United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (suggesting that "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities"). But cf Kenji
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell," 108 YALE L.J. 485 (1998) (arguing that the Court should return to a
political-powerlessness standard because standards of immutability and invisibility have become
overdeterminative of the amount of protection given to marginalized groups).
8. I follow the definition of "higher lawmaking" provided by Anthony Dillof: "laws
regulating the power of other institutions." Anthony M. Dillof, Romer v. Evans and the
Constitutionality of Higher Lawmaking, 60 ALB. L. REV. 361, 380 (1996); see also I BRUCI
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 6 (1991) (defining "higher lawmaking" through
procedural characteristics rather than in close relation to natural law). As described by Professor
Ackerman, decisions of higher lawmaking are undertaken in the requisite "deliberative fora,"
where particular initiatives are brought before "the People" and resolved on their merits. This is
to be distinguished from the process of normal lawmaking in which the People delegate their
decisioninaking power to representatives through elections. See I ACKERMAN, supra, at 6. In this
sense, higher lawmaking may occur at federal, state, and municipal levels whenever an
amendment to a governing charter or constitution is considered. In contrast, Ackerman defines
"higher law" as "a set of fundamental commitments" under the law that elected officials are not
empowered to modify. See Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products. 98 HARV. L. REV.
713, 742 (1985).
9. Because they involve higher lawmaking, the political restructuring cases tend to implicate
acts of direct democracy. This Note will not attempt to answer the general question of what are
the proper procedural and substantive restraints placed on the exercise of direct democracy. For
notable critiques of direct democracy, as well as recommendations for constitutional restraint, see
Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 143 (1995)
(suggesting a supermajority requirement for constitutional amendments through statewide
initiative in order to protect the integrity of higher lawmaking); Derrick A. Bell, Jr.. The
Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978) (arguing that
the civil rights of racial minorities are particularly vulnerable under direct democracy); Sherman J.
Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democt-acy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998) (arguing that in
order for direct democracy to control against its tendency to distort information, deliberation
must-and yet presumably cannot-include a means for participants to express their priorities);
Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990) (presenting the
"counter-intuitive" thesis that judicial review of direct democracy calls for less judicial restraint
as compared with the review of representative democracy); Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil
Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. Sci. 245 (1997) (arguing more generally that the civil
rights of social minorities are unacceptably vulnerable under direct democracy); and Clayton P.
Gillette, Is Direct Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 609 (1998) (discussing




restructuring impose a "special disability" '" upon a minority group,
regardless of whether that group currently qualifies as a suspect class. Thus,
the Court's reasoning engenders an open-ended opportunity to
"reconstruct"" significant portions of the equal protection doctrine. This
Note will attempt to determine what vision of democratic equality best
unlocks the meaning of the political restructuring cases after Romer, and so
can best serve as a guide to the elaboration of future doctrine.
Process-based theories of equal protection have long recognized that
some social minorities must receive heightened judicial protection if they
are to be prevented from becoming perpetual losers in our political
system. 2 Positivist political theorists have acceded to the process-
perfection school insofar as it seeks to restore the conditions under which
disadvantaged minorities may participate equally in coalition politics.' 3
Effective participation by minorities requires that neither their interests nor
their identities be so severely stigmatized as to spoil the receptiveness of
10. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
11. By "reconstruction" I mean that Romer affords lawyers an opportunity to reconceive of
the constitutional guarantee of equal protection in a way that potentially enlarges its scope. One
modest way of effecting this reconstruction is to interpret Romer as a signal by the Court that
sexual orientation can function constitutionally in a way analogous to suspect classification.
Another is to place Romer along a continuum of equal protection cases in which state actions were
invalidated under rationality review, thus demonstrating the ability of the Equal Protection Clause
to protect gays and lesbians, as well as members of other non-suspect classifications, without
recourse to higher levels of scrutiny. See Cass R. Sunstein, Te Supreme Court. 1995 Term-
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4. 63 (1996) (hypothesizing a
continuum of rationality-review equal protection cases "reflect[ing the Court's) understanding
that other groups, not only African Americans, may be subject to unreasoning hatred and
suspicion"). Still other commentators have discovered in Romer a variety of previously hidden
substantive constitutional commitments to preclude governmental collusion in the maintenance of
status hierarchies. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness,
95 MICH. L. REv. 203, 217-20 (1996) (contending that the plaintiffs in Romer should have
succeeded, regardless of the Equal Protection Clause, because Amendment 2 constituted a status-
based punishment impermissible under the Bill of Attainder Clause); J.M. Balkin. The
Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313. 2316-20 (1997) (theorizing a constitutional
commitment to the disestablishment of social-status hierarchies supported by Justice Kennedy's
claim that the Constitution will not abide the desire to harm a politically unpopular group
(referring to Romer, 517 U.S. at 639)); Barbara J. Flagg, "Animus" and Moral Disapproval: A
Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REv. 833 (1998) (arguing that Romer establishes that
moral disapproval toward an unpopular minority cannot constitute a legitimate interest under
equal protection); Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of
Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453 (1997) (interpreting Romer to establish that government
must treat all citizens as persons of equal worth).
12. For the most influential articulation of a process-based theory of judicial review, see
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). Professor Ely articulates a
"representation-reinforcing" function for the judiciary, according to which courts should
intervene in order to correct democratic malfunction whenever -representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest." Id. at 103.
13. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 8. But Professor Ackerman cautions that the traditional
criteria for political powerlessness---the standards of discreteness and insularity articulated in
Justice Stone's famous footnote number four to Carolene Products-are in fact poor indicia for
political effectiveness. See id. at 720 (criticizing the Carolene standard as -indiscriminate").
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potential coalition partners. 4 In a tiered democratic regime such as our
own, majorities may be constructed not only by horizontally rearranging the
coalition but also by vertically stepping upward in the level of
decisionmaking institutions. Thus, a political loser at one level of
government may seek an alternative, higher level at which to construct the
majority that will enact its particular point of view. 5 In the case of anti-gay
rights initiatives, this means that voters in a local context where gays and
lesbians are socially integrated may not view their acceptance of
homosexual lifestyles to produce an impermissible social or material cost.
They may, therefore, support legal protections for gays and lesbians. But
majorities constructed at a jurisdictional level removed from the same
social situation may be more easily convinced of the costs of tolerance, and
they may oppose such protections on the basis of this remote threat.
Throughout this Note, I will refer to the technique of seeking a
sympathetic majority at a higher level of governmental decisionmaking as
strategic majority construction. This term describes the scenario in which a
majority of the electorate uses its majoritarian status at one jurisdictional
level in order to repeal the rights of an unpopular minority at various sub-
jurisdictional levels of government. 6 The consequence of repealing those
14. See, e.g., PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE AND PARTY COMPETITION IN
AMERICA 10 (1999) (discussing African-American voters as an example of a group frequently
unable to participate effectively in electoral coalitions because the appeal by political leaders to
their interests may cause white voters to resign from the coalition); see also WILLIAM H. RIKEiR,
THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS 103 (1962) (stating that the success of coalition-building
must be limited by the principle that "no decision can be undertaken in such a way that losers
would prefer to resign rather than acquiesce").
15. Such a group may additionally benefit from the change in decisionmaking rules attached
to the superordinate level of government, as well as from the fact that the decision is now
somewhat removed from the intimate situation in which it was first considered. More crucial.
however, is the fact that majorities tend not to perceive the change either in rules or in venue as
affecting their claim to democratic legitimacy. Rather, precisely because their exercise of power is
consistent with formal democratic rules, voters in the majority are easily convinced of their
authority to entrench political and social hierarchies. See IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY'S PLACE
238 (1996) (" [P]erhaps especially, when they acquire it legitimately, power holders all too easily
convince themselves that their authority should expand in space and time... and that
subordinates lack the requisite ability to ascend from their inferior roles."). As Professor Shapiro
has elaborated, the "allure of power can ... divert power holders within hierarchies from their
legitimate goals," turning their attention to campaigns of domination. Id. Thus, a reliance upon
hierarchy tends to transform itself into an interest in hierarchy and consequently into domination.
For this reason, principles of democratic equality should prevent democratic institutions from
being used to establish and to legitimate unjust social and political hierarchies. Cf. Balkin. supra
note 11, at 2368 (arguing that "we care about the inability of minority groups to form coalitions"
because democracy entails a substantive commitment to resist "unjust status hierarchies,"
regardless of whether they are supported by a majority).
16. The idea of strategic majority construction derives from the familiar principle that
democratic majorities are contingent and multiform rather than static and uniform entities. See.
e.g., Ackerman, supra note 8, at 720 ("According to [the pluralist] view, it is a naive mistake to
speak of democracy as if it involved rule by a single, well-defined majority over a coherent and
constant minority."); Franz Lehner & Hans Gerd Schiltte, The Economic Theory of Politics:
Suggestions for Reconsideration, in POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 139, 157 (Brian Barry ed.,
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acts at a higher governmental level is that the institutions ordinarily
entrusted to make such determinations will be forced to operate under a gag
rule insofar as future acts affecting the rights of the impacted minority are
concerned. The issue for judicial consideration is whether such acts of
political restructuring should be subjected to special review under the Equal
Protection Clause. This Note will argue that they should be.
Part II will discuss Romer v. Evans as a pivotal episode in the Supreme
Court's political restructuring jurisprudence. In that case, the Court
expanded its view that political majorities should be prohibited from
imposing special burdens upon minorities to include the protection of gays
and lesbians. This Part will argue that, in its political restructuring decisions
prior to Romer, the Court did not rely upon suspect classification doctrine
when it interpreted acts of higher lawmaking imposing a political disability
upon a racial minority to trigger strict scrutiny. This Part concludes with the
demonstration that the Romer Court's failure to reconcile its decision with
the racial restructuring cases has caused doctrinal instability.
Part I will examine three views of democratic equality: formalism,
process perfection, and deliberative politics. This Part will argue that the
third view synthesizes aspects of the first two and yet, in its most general
form, remains inadequate to describe with precision the commitment to
democratic equality animating the restructuring cases. This Part will
consider in particular how one instrument of the deliberative view, the
judicial exercise of "decisional minimalism," "7 may serve as a means to
uphold the same commitment to facilitate democracy that is sometimes
claimed as the justification for acts of restructuring. It will argue that the
danger of decisional minimalism is that it may lead to debilitating doctrinal
confusions. This Part will argue in particular that minimalism cannot be
justified when the Court has purposefully avoided determining the
significance of structural rather than substantive acts.
1976) (" [P]olitical decisionmaking in terms of votes and elections represents a process of
changing coalitions that never allows for a stable majority.").
The political restructuring cases propose not simply the question whether majoritarian
politics authorizes the repeal of minority protections at any level of government, regardless of the
level at which they were initially enacted, but in addition the question whether political actors
should be permitted to manipulate the political process precisely in order to construct the majority
that will retrench minority interests. The idea of strategic majority construction is intended to call
attention to the fact that certain manipulations of political process create the opportunity for
certain kinds of majorities to exercise power. But see Ackerman. supra note 8, at 718-19 (arguing
that process theory should also be concerned with the problem of "ineffective majorities" caused
by impediments to mass organization). This Note will argue that the political restructuring cases
reflect the Court's willingness to curtail the effects of strategy, or power. in politics within an
equal protection framework. See infra Section IV.B.
17. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 6-7 (defining "decisional minimalism" as "the
phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as
possible undecided").
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This Part will also discuss how acts of higher lawmaking, whether at
the state or the municipal level, function as gag rules to bind the actions of
lower governmental institutions.' Either by conserving resources or by
retarding activity in a controversial area of legislation, such as
antidiscrimination law, gag rules may in fact aid democracies to function.
Nevertheless, the kinds of gag rules employed in the political restructuring
cases include prohibitions against the consideration of minority interests,
thereby generating equal protection controversies. Part III concludes by
highlighting problems posed by the use of gag rules, ultimately repudiating
the use of the deliberative vision of democratic equality to justify the
subjugation of social minorities through higher lawmaking.
Part IV will provide an alternative reading of Romer in which the
Court's prohibition against the creation of a special disability for minority
groups is developed as a core constitutional insight. Although this Part is
critical of the reasoning presented in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, it
nevertheless interprets the opinion's fundamental prohibition against
imposing political disability upon a minority group to be consistent with the
earlier line of restructuring cases. This Part ultimately provides an
explanation of why Romer is a more egregious, and therefore an "easier,"
case than the racial restructuring cases, in that Amendment 2 specifically
targeted gays and lesbians for unequal treatment.
Part V develops the vision of democratic equality articulated in Romer.
This Part argues that constitutional democracy contains a commitment to
prevent democratic structures from burdening identifiable social groups
through a coordinate form of political and social disability. This Part will
attempt to revise traditional concerns over unjust classification within the
structural dilemma presented by political restructuring. Under this
reconstructed model, suspect classifications will not be the lone trigger for
heightened scrutiny. Instead, acts of higher lawmaking will draw
heightened scrutiny whenever they withdraw minority interests from equal
consideration. The final section of this Part will apply the reconstructed
doctrine to a variety of cases and hypothetical situations. Part VI concludes
by summarizing the arguments of this Note and claiming that this structural
account of the political restructuring cases, and the subtending democratic
commitments that rationalize their decisions, is a necessary first step toward
enriching our understanding of equal protection.
18. Political theorists have endorsed the use of gag rules in constitutional democracies as a
legitimate means for majorities to bind themselves (as well as the minorities under their
jurisdiction) against the future possibility of exerting their legitimate authority in a particular area.
See, e.g., Stephen Holmes, Gag Rules or the Politics of Omission, in CONSTITUTIONALISM ANt)
DEMOCRACY 19 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988). Holmes defines gag rules through a
variety of examples from standing law to constitutional amendments. Gag rules function by
removing a particular issue from institutional consideration, even to the point of "officially" or
"effectively" discussing its merits.
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II. ROMER V. EVANS AND THE INSTABILITY OF POLITICAL
RESTRUCTURING JURISPRUDENCE
A. Romer v. Evans
On November 3, 1992, the Colorado electorate enacted Amendment 2
to the state constitution by a vote of 53% to 47% in a statewide
referendum.'9 The amendment was largely a response to several Colorado
municipal ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. 20 Amendment 2 repealed these ordinances only insofar as they
protected individuals on the basis of their homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual
status; the State of Colorado claimed that the amendment was not intended
to repeal general antidiscrimination ordinances that extended protection on
an unrelated basis (for example, racial or legal status). The amendment also
prohibited "all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of state
or local government designed to protect the named class." 2' In addition to
responding to local statutes, Amendment 2 emerged from a national
political and social controversy regarding the validity and of gay rights.'
The cities of Denver, Boulder, and Aspen, whose antidiscrimination
ordinances were repealed by Amendment 2, sued to invalidate the
19. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). Amendment 2, entitled
"No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation," provided as
follows:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts. shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be
the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the
Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b.
20. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-24 (1996); see also. e.g.. BOULDER REV. CODE
§ 12-1-1 (defining "sexual orientation" as "the choice of sexual partners, i.e., bisexual.
homosexual or heterosexual"); DENVER REV. MUN. CODE. art. IV, § 28-92 (defining "sexual
orientation" as "[t]he status of an individual as to his or her heterosexuality, homosexuality or
bisexuality").
21. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
22. See Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives. 106 HARV. L REV. 1905,
1905 & n.1 (1993) (noting that the laws of 139 jurisdictions in the United States protect gays and
lesbians from discrimination); id. at 1908-09 (describing national political campaigns organized to
repeal these laws). In the early 1990s, measures similar to Amendment 2 were reviewed by
statewide referenda in Oregon, Idaho, and Maine. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 458 n.24 (listing
several media sources for coverage of these initiatives). Although the fact was not reflected in its
language, the sponsors of Amendment 2 (like those of similar amendments in other states)
portrayed antidiscrimination legislation benefiting gays and lesbians as the first step in a gay
rights agenda that would ultimately lead to a social plague, including child molestation. See. e.g.,
Brief for Respondents at 48, Romer (No. 94-1039) (reporting a leaflet distributed by
Amendment 2 sponsors that stated that " [s]exual molestation of children is a large part of many
homosexuals' lifestyle-part of the very lifestyle 'gay-rights' activists want government to give
special class, ethnic status!").
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amendment nine days after its adoption. The trial court granted a
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the amendment, and the case
reached the Colorado Supreme Court on appeal. The state supreme court
decided the case according to the equal protection doctrine established to
review popular lawmaking targeting unpopular groups. 3 The court found
that Amendment 2 should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, because it
denied the "fundamental right to participate equally in the political
process" to an "identifiable class of persons."24 The court upheld the
injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The United
States Supreme Court rejected this reasoning but approved the result,
invalidating the Colorado amendment under the rational basis test without
relying upon the Hunter doctrine' to justify heightened scrutiny.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion relied upon two separate
arguments. Kennedy first claimed that Amendment 2 failed the equal
protection challenge because it violated a novel per se rule against imposing
a "broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group."26
Second, he argued that the amendment's "sheer breadth is so discontinuous
with [the state's offered justifications] that the amendment seems
inexplicable by anything but animus towards the class that it affects."27
Justice Kennedy rejected the state's claim that Amendment 2 merely "puts
gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons"28 by repealing
the so-called "special rights" conferred under several municipal
ordinances. Rather, because these ordinances extended protection against
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, removing their protection
as to gays and lesbians would not repeal the statutes entirely: Heterosexuals
would retain the same protection repealed from the targeted class. 9 While
this observation does something to support the Court's contention that
Amendment 2 was based impermissibly upon animus," it does little to
explain just how the amendment constituted a "denial of equal protection of
23. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1279-82 (Colo. 1993) (discussing Supreme Court
precedent); see also infra Section II.B.
24. Evans, 854 P.2d at 1282.
25. See infra Section II.B.
26. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kennedy went so far as to suggest (probably correctly) that these protections are in fact
"taken for granted by most people either because they already have them or do not need them."
Id. at 631. Therefore, it is absurd that they should be maintained for this social majority to whom
they are either irrelevant or effectively secured without need of additional protection, and
withdrawn from those for whom they have some meaning.
30. For the position that the Court's finding of animus remains woefully unsupported, see
Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 135-
36 (1997); Robert F. Nagel, Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 167, 171-72 (1997):
and Roger Craig Green, Note, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial
Technique, 108 YALE L.J. 439, 447-48 & n.31 (1998).
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the laws in the most literal sense."' Justice Kennedy explained that
Amendment 2 represented a kind of per se violation of equal protection
because it declared "that in general it shall be more difficult for one group
of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government." 
32
Justice Scalia rejected the Court's arguments. Contrary to the
majority's conclusion that Amendment 2 emanated from a bare desire to
harm gays and lesbians, Justice Scalia characterized the amendment as
"rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve
traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful
minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." 33 Referring to the
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick," Justice Scalia claimed that "[i]f
it is constitutionally permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct
criminal, surely it is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other
laws merely disfavoring homosexual conduct., 35 This argument is
attractive because Justice Kennedy conspicuously declined to discuss
Bowers at all. The argument is incomplete, however, because it depends
upon collapsing the distinction between conduct and status.' Furthermore,
even at its most formidable, the argument can prevail only against the
Court's application of rational basis scrutiny and not against its per se
argument.
37
In response to the per se argument, Justice Scalia declared that "[t ] he
central thesis of the Court's reasoning is that any group is denied equal
protection when, to obtain advantage (or, presumably, to avoid
disadvantage), it must have recourse to a more general and hence more
difficult level of political decisionmaking than others."" Scalia illustrated
his observation by claiming that, under the majority's logic, "a state law
prohibiting the award of municipal contracts to relatives of mayors or city
councilmen" 39 would violate equal protection because these relatives would
have to vindicate their collective interest through a higher level of political
decisionmaking than would non-relatives who need only plead their case
before the municipality. One may take exception with this interpretation of
the per se rule, by claiming that the rule prohibits not the unequal burdens
caused by political restructuring but the status harms caused by selecting a
31. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
34. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a gay man's conviction under an anti-sodomy statute on
the grounds that homosexual sodomy is not a constitutionally protected activity).
35. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
36. See Amar, supra note 11, at 231-32.
37. See The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases. 110 HARV. L REV. 135, 163
(1996).
38. Romer, 517 U.S. at 639 (Scalia, J.. dissenting).
39. Id
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particular group from which to withhold basic legal protections.40 Under
this view, however, courts might resist using heightened scrutiny to review
the repeal of preferential policies, such as affirmative action, because the
latter involve "special" protections the retrenchment of which is less easily
attributable to an invidious purpose.
Professor Cass R. Sunstein has further developed this view. Sunstein
argues that the "underlying judgment in Romer must be... that it is no
longer legitimate to discriminate against homosexuals as a class simply
because the state wants to discourage homosexuality or homosexual
behavior.""a Instead, the state must justify its actions on "some other,
public-regarding ground." 42 Sunstein suggests that the state might satisfy
this burden by showing that laws disadvantaging homosexuals were
constructed in order to curb behaviors that harm legitimate governmental
interests. 3 This interpretation fails to resolve whether the repeal of
"special" protections would similarly require a public-regarding
justification since the state in denying them could not be said to have
discriminated."4 More crucially, Sunstein's interpretation seems both to
overstate the nature of the state's accountability to homosexuals (and other
minority groups) after Romer45 and to understate the significance of
political restructuring to the Court's condemnation of Amendment 2 as a
per se violation of equal protection.
Justice Kennedy portrayed Amendment 2 to have created a "special
disability" for gays and lesbians by withholding from them the "safeguards
that others enjoy or may seek without constraint." 4 6 He further described
40. See, e.g., Tile Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 37. at 161 (" [Tlhe
per se rule is not about levels of decisionmaking, but about the very meaning of equal protection
of the laws."); see also Jay S. Bybee, The Equal Process Clause: A Note on the (Non)relationship
Between Romer v. Evans and Hunter v. Erickson, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 201, 227 (1997)
("[T]he problem in Romer is not the process.").
41. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 62.
42. Id. On this point, while citing Sunstein in order to describe the limitations of the Romer
holding, the Sixth Circuit crucially misstates his meaning. See Equality Foundation Ill, 1998 WL
101701, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998) (falsely equating Sunstein's statement that Romer. ts an
example of decisional minimalism, leaves open issues for further democratic deliberation with the
meaning that the Court's ruling is narrowly crafted to decide the factual question of relocating
decisionmaking power at a higher level of government (citing Sunstein, supra note II, at 7)). That
so much explanation should produce so much confusion may itself be a telltale sign of Romer's
explanatory deficiencies.
43. See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 98.
44. Professor Sunstein suggests that this is a plausible view in an earlier work discussing the
logic of the racial restructuring cases. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 157 ("Race-specific
classifications are not ... all the same. Opposition to busing for purposes of racial balance is
different from opposition to antidiscrimination legislation, because it is more easily supportable
with noninvidious justifications."). This view does find limited support in Justice Kennedy's
opinion. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 ("We find nothing special in the protections
Amendment 2 withholds.").
45. Indeed, if under minimal scrutiny courts should inquire whether a particular minority
deserved to be disadvantaged, this innovation seems to obviate the need for tiered scrutiny.
46. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
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Amendment 2 as having abandoned homosexuals to "obtain specific
protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of
Colorado."'4 Justice Kennedy invoked the per se rule in order to protect
gays and lesbians from being disabled by a special political impediment to
the pursuit of their interests through the democratic process. Thus, his
opinion suggests a moderate alternative to both Justice Scalia's and
Professor Sunstein's interpretations: that an act of political restructuring
singling out a particular minority for the repeal of policies benefiting its
interests, thereby subjecting its subsequent policy ventures to a higher and
more remote level of political decisionmaking, should be considered a per
se violation of equal protection. Although Justice Kennedy's neglect of
earlier restructuring precedent complicates the work of tracing a connection
between Romer and those cases, the remainder of this Note will
demonstrate that such a connection not only is possible, but is fruitful as a
means of illuminating Romer and of resolving many of the controversies
that have issued in its wake.
B. The Hunter Doctrine
In 1964, the Akron, Ohio, city council enacted a fair housing ordinance
prohibiting discrimination in the transfer of real property on the basis of
race, religion, or ancestry. Opponents of the ordinance responded by
petitioning for an amendment to the city charter, requiring approval by a
majority of the electorate for any city ordinance that regulated the transfer
of real property "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin or
ancestry."' At a general election, the amendment was adopted as
section 137 of the Akron city charter. Nellie Hunter, an African-American
citizen of Akron, filed a complaint under the pre-existing ordinance after a
real estate agent refused to show her any homes whose owners had
articulated a prejudice against black buyers. Her claims were denied on the
ground that section 137 had repealed the city's fair housing ordinance. 9 In
Hunter v. Erickson,50 the Supreme Court overturned the state court's ruling,
concluding that section 137 violated the Equal Protection Clause by
hindering blacks as a group from enacting legislation in their collective
interest.
The Hunter decision gave rise to an area of equal protection
jurisprudence authorizing the use of heightened scrutiny to review the
constitutionality of political restructuring that disadvantaged minority
groups. The Hunter doctrine embodies the democratic principle that
47. Id.
48. AKRON CrrY CHARTER § 137, quoted in Hunter v. Erickson. 393 U.S. 385. 387 (1969).
49. See Hunter v. Erickson, 233 N.E.2d 129 (Ohio 1966), rev'd. 393 U.S. 385.
50. 393 U.S. 385.
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democratic majorities retain the right to restructure the political process so
long as they do so by neutral rather than discriminatory means. The fact that
section 137 was the product of direct democracy could not immunize it
against constitutional review, Justice White wrote for the majority.5 ' Nor
could the city justify the amendment as an effort "to move slowly in the
delicate area of race relations." 52 The Court concluded that the government
"may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more
difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's
vote or give any group a smaller representation than another of comparable
size." 53 Thus, although the Akron amendment itself made no specific racial
classification, the Hunter Court invoked the judicial machinery of strict
scrutiny because the amendment imposed "special burdens on racial
minorities within the governmental process." '
Justice Harlan's concurrence provides further insight into the
restructuring dilemma. Justice Harlan distinguished mere statutes from laws
that, as examples of higher lawmaking, "define[d] the structure of political
institutions." 55 The legitimate purpose of higher lawmaking, according to
Justice Harlan, is to provide "a just framework within which the diverse
political groups in our society may fairly compete" rather than to assist
"one particular group in its struggle with its political opponents." 56 Such a
framework depends upon the allocation of political power according to
"neutral principles," whereby every group within a community should
experience an equal degree of difficulty when attempting to enact laws in
its self-interest. 7 Majorities, in other words, should not be permitted
through institutions of higher lawmaking to construct expressions of their
interests as structural barriers to the interests of minorities.
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,5' the Court followed
Hunter by invalidating an amendment to the Washington Constitution
51. See id. at 392.
52. Id.; see also id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring) (rejecting the proffered justification).
53. Id. at 393.
54. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 393 (Harlan, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 393.
57. Id. at 394-95. The Court reiterated Harlan's view in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. I (1971).
In Gordon, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a 60% supermajority requirement imposed
by West Virginia upon its political subdivisions before they could either incur bonded
indebtedness or exceed constitutional tax rates. A proposal by the Roane County school board
received only slightly more than 50% approval from county voters. Proponents of the proposal
challenged the supermajority requirement on equal protection grounds. Writing for the majority.
Justice Burger stated that while "any departure from strict majority rule gives disproportionate
power to the minority" there "is nothing in the language of the Constitution, our history, or our
cases that requires that a majority always prevail on every issue." Id. at 6. Applying Harlan's idea
of neutrality, the Court concluded that "so long as such provisions do not discriminate against or
authorize discrimination against any identifiable class they do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause." Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
58. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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adopted through statewide initiative. 9 That amendment (" Initiative 350")
prohibited school boards from requiring any student to submit to forced
busing.' ° The initiative, however, contained so many exceptions to this
prohibition that it allowed school boards considerable discretion to assign
pupils for reasons other than to enforce a policy of racial desegregation.6
The initiative repealed a desegregation policy instituted by the Seattle
School District.6 Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun concluded that
Initiative 350 was indistinguishable from the Hunter charter amendment
because each repealed policies that "inure[d] primarily to the benefit of the
minority." 63 Initiative 350 restructured the political process by removing
race-based pupil assignment to the control of the state legislature, while
other issues germane to the electoral majority of non-blacks were left in the
hands of local government. Thus, the Court determined that Initiative 350
"subtly distort[ed] governmental processes in such a way as to place special
burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial
legislation." 6
The Seattle School District majority faced powerful opposition in a
dissenting opinion written by Justice Powell and joined by Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor.6 Powell argued that Washington was under no
constitutional obligation to maintain the availability of mandatory busing as
a racial remedy to school segregation. 66 He thus characterized the Court's
ruling as an "unprecedented intrusion into the structure of a state
government" 67 because it had effectively established that "only the local or
subordinate entity that approved [a racial remedy] will have authority to
change it.'' 8 Powell warned that "[iun a democratic system there are
winners and losers,"69 and that whenever a state addresses controversial
questions, some significant segment of its population will be
disadvantaged.70 Furthermore, he argued that Initiative 350 did not
constitute an act of political restructuring, because the state had not
59. See id. at 462-66, 486-87.
60. See id at 462.
61. See id
62. See id. at 463-64.
63. Id. at 472; see also id. at 474 (" [I]t is enough that minorities may consider busing for
integration to be 'legislation that is in their interest.'" (quoting Hunter v. Erickson. 393 U.S. 385.
395 (1969) (H-arlan, J., concurring))).
64. d at 467.
65. See id. at 488 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. See id at 491-92.
67. Id. at489.
68. Id at 494-95. In a prescient counterexample, Justice Powell invited the Court to consider
whether its present rule would permit any governmental official or institution not traditionally
granted authority over school admissions policies to revoke an affirmative action admissions
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constructed a new and extraordinary political barrier to policies benefiting a
racial minority.7 He distinguished the charter amendment invalidated by
Hunter because that law had required that future fair housing legislation be
subjected to a mandatory referendum process, an obstacle that the city of
Akron did not uniformly impose on new legislation.72
Justice Blackmun's response to Justice Powell was twofold: First, he
argued that Initiative 350 fell into the category of suspect legislation
established by Hunter because it repealed "legislation designed to benefit
minorities 'as minorities,' not legislation intended to benefit some larger
group of underprivileged citizens among whom minorities were
disproportionately represented." 73 Second, Blackmun reiterated that the
"evil" condemned in Hunter was "the comparative structural burden
placed on the political achievement of minority interests." 74
Justice Blackmun developed this idea further in his concurrence in a
companion decision, Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education." In the
latter case, the Court similarly reviewed the constitutionality of a state
constitutional amendment (Proposition I) prohibiting the use of busing for
purposes of racial desegregation. In Crawford, however, the California
electorate had merely repealed the availability of busing as a judicial
remedy for school segregation under the state constitution.76 In his majority
opinion, Justice Powell reiterated the principle that a state may repeal
protections that it provides in excess of those that the Federal Constitution
requires.77 Blackmun assented to this view, but argued in addition that,
while Proposition I may have hampered desegregation within the state, it
was nevertheless constitutional because it had not effected a "structural
change in the political process."78 Instead, Blackmun saw the amendment
as a mere repeal, since it had been both created and repealed at the state
constitutional level. 79 Blackmun found Proposition I to be constitutional
71. See id. at 497-98.
72. See id. at 497.
73. Id. at 485.
74. Id. at 474-75 n.17.
75. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
76. Prior to the passage of Proposition 1, the California Supreme Court had interpreted the
Equal Protection Clause of the state constitution to permit state courts to compel desegregation
through mandatory busing, whether segregation within the school district was de facto or de jure
in origin. See id. at 530-31 (citing Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 34 (1976)).
Proposition I limited the power of the state courts by permitting busing as a judicial remedy only
in order to address violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, and then only in cases in which "a federal court would be permitted
under federal decisional law to impose that obligation" upon an offending school district. Id. at
532.
77. See id. at 535; accord Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 491-92 (Powell. J., dissenting).
78. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
79. See id. at 547 ("In short, the people of California-the same 'entity' that put in place the
State Consitution, and created the enforceable obligation to desegregate-have made the
desegregation obligation judicially unenforceable."); see also Sunstein, supra note 5. at 157-64
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because its function of mere repeal conformed to Justice Harlan's view that
political structures should establish a "just framework" for competition
between political groups."0 By contrast, Blackmun viewed Initiative 350 as
an allocation of political power "plac[ing] unusual burdens on the ability of
racial groups to enact legislation specifically designed to overcome the
'special condition' of prejudice,' thereby violating Harlan's neutrality
principle. For this reason, Blackmun argued that it would be an
"excessively fornal exercise" to argue "that the procedural revisions at
issue in Hunter imposed special burdens on minorities, but that the
selective allocation of decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350
does not erect comparable political obstacles." '
Like Justice Scalia, Justice Powell has espoused principles of
democratic formalism, 3 arguing that the legitimacy of the process by which
the initiative was enacted should be sufficient to justify its alterations to the
political process.' This formalist view holds that political majorities are
sovereign whenever they obey established democratic procedures and avoid
substantive areas construed to infringe upon a fundamental right. Under the
formalist view, the Constitution "permits majorities to impose their vision
of morality as long as no fundamental right or suspect classification is
affected." 8 5 The doctrinal instability of the political restructuring doctrine
creates an opportunity for formalist arguments to prevail over the positions
taken by the Court in Seattle School District and Romer because democratic
formalism has the advantage of permitting courts to decide cases without
appearing to intrude into political mattersss It has the appearance,
(arguing that California's Proposition I can be distinguished from Washington's Initiative 350
because the former is a mere repeal of minority protection while the latter is a "repeal plus." an
act of restructuring that places special burdens upon the targeted minority).
80. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Hunter v. Erickson. 393
U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
81. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 486 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.. 304
U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)).
82. Md. at 474-75 n.17 (emphasis added).
83. Professor Cass Sunstein has developed this term to describe Justice Scalia's
jurisprudence. See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529,
530-31, 533 (1997) (reviewing ANTONIN SCAUA, A MATIER OF INTERPRETATIoN (1997))
(defining democratic formalism as an approach designed to ensure that democratic judgments are
treated with extreme deference but criticizing this approach for "identiflyingi democracy with
whatever happens to emerge from majoritarian politics").
84. It should be noted, however, that Justice Scalia's preference for democratic formalism
appears to be more entrenched than Justice Powell's. Compare Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620.
636, 644-46 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (approving of the Colorado electorate's attempt to
express its moral disapproval of homosexual lifestyles through constitutional amendment). with
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 240 (1982) (Powell, J.. concurring) (" ITlhe exclusion [of children
who are not U.S. citizens] from state-provided education is a kind of punitive discrimination
based on status that is impermissible under the Equal Protection Clause.").
85. Balkin, supra note 11, at 2318 (characterizing the view expressed by Justice Scalia in
Romer).
86. In a final footnote to the Seattle School District dissent, Justice Powell revealed that he
did not agree with the substance of Initiative 350 as a matter of policy (that is. removing local
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moreover, of permitting the people to rule according to the neutrality of
their numbers.
C. Doctrinal Instability After Romer: The Appeal of Democratic
Formalism
After deciding Romer in 1996, the Court remanded to the Sixth Circuit
for review consistent with its ruling a case involving an amendment to the
Cincinnati city charter (Article XII) prohibiting any branch of the municipal
government from conferring protection upon homosexual persons on the
basis of their sexual status.87 A coalition of individuals and community
organizations in Cincinnati had challenged the new charter provision on
federal constitutional grounds. In Equality Foundation of Greater
Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati,88 the Sixth Circuit upheld Article XII
because it served the purportedly constitutional purpose of liberating
individuals who chose to "disassociate themselves from homosexuals" by
eliminating their exposure to punishment under local antidiscrimination
ordinances.89 On remand, the circuit court distinguished Article XII from
Colorado's Amendment 2 by arguing that the political disability created by
the former did not reach the magnitude of a disadvantaging amendment to
the state constitution." The Sixth Circuit thus distinguished Romer on its
facts, claiming that it had involved a "substantially different enactment[] of
entirely distinct scope and impact." 9 Because the Supreme Court in Romer
had not presented its ruling as a development of the Hunter doctrine, the
circuit court was able to infer that the racial restructuring cases did not
control the question of political disability suffered by gays and lesbians.
One might describe the Sixth Circuit decision as an anomaly because it
focused falsely and repeatedly upon distinctions without a difference.92 The
Sixth Circuit, however, buttressed its decision with a formalist argument
reminiscent of Justice Powell's Seattle School District dissent. The court
control over educational remedies from regional school boards), though his formalist arguments
were intended to indicate that he, unlike the majority, was not allowing his personal preferences to
sway him toward judicial activism. See Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. at 501 n. 17 (" In my view [as a
former school board member], the local school board-responsible to the people of the district it
serves-is the best qualified agency of the state government to make decisions affecting education
within its district.").
87. See Equality Foundation 11, 128 F.3d 289, 291 (6th Cir. 1997).
88. Equality Foundation 1, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995).
89. Id. at 270.
90. See Equality Foundation II, 128 F.3d at 294-95; see also id. at 297 ("[I]he opponents of
that strictly local enactment need not undertake the monumental political task of procuring an
amendment to the Ohio Constitution as a precondition to achievement of a desired change in the
local law ... ").
91. Id. at 295.
92. See Jason D. Kimpel, Note, "Distinctions Without a Difference": How the SLth Circuit
Misread Romer v. Evans, 74 IND. L.J. 991 (1999).
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argued that the people of Cincinnati retained the right to restrain the policy
decisions of their elected officials, including members of the city council,
because in so doing they were not in fact raising the decision to a higher
level of government. In both instances, the decision was made at the
jurisdictional level of the city. Therefore, Article XII merely represented a
"direct expression of the local community will" 93 rather than a usurpation
of jurisdictional authority. This argument parallels Justice Powell's claim
that an agent of the state cannot usurp the state's plenary governing
authority any more than the state can be restrained from engaging in
political reorganization within its subdivisions.'
The Ninth Circuit in Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson adopted
a similar formalist rationale when it declined to enjoin the enforcement of
Proposition 209, an amendment to the California Constitution prohibiting
the use of race- and gender-based affirmative action programs by
governmental agencies. The circuit court paused rhetorically to
acknowledge the awesome responsibility of reviewing the amendment,
stating that "[a] system which permits one judge to block with the stroke of
a pen what 4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity
of our constitutional democracy." 6 Following Justice Powell's formula, the
court first declared that removal of racial remedies from governmental
consideration did not itself constitute a violation of equal protection.97 It
then repudiated the significance of political restructuring in the case, stating
that the fact "[t]hat a law resolves an issue at a higher level of state
government says nothing in and of itself."9' The court claimed that the
Seattle School District majority had not intended the result, prophesied by
Powell, that a subdivision of the state might be able to usurp state authority
by granting benefits to minorities in excess of any constitutional
requirement. Instead, it claimed that Seattle School District permits the state
to relinquish racial remedies provided by its subdivisions when the repeal
serves a neutral purpose, including the repeal of race- and gender-based
benefits."
However, these explanations fail to acknowledge that the Supreme
Court might have decided Ronmer in such a way as to preclude the circuit
court's evasive rationale. The Court's avoidance of the Hunter doctrine has
93. Equality Foundation I1, 128 F.3d at 297 & n.8.
94. See supra text accompanying note 72.
95. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997).
96. Id. at699.
97. See id at 702 ("A law that prohibits the State from classifying individuals by race or
gender a fortiori does not classify individuals by race or gender. Proposition 209's ban on race
and gender preferences, as a matter of law and logic, does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
in any conventional sense."); see also id. at 704 ("No one contends that individuals have a
constitutional right to preferential treatment solely on the basis of their race or gender.").
98. Id. at706.
99. See id. at 707.
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led to doctrinal instability insofar as future political restructuring cases are
concerned. The Romer Court repudiated the notion that an act of political
restructuring is neutral because the protections that it repeals are not
constitutionally required. Had the Romer Court looked for a way to
harmonize its decision with existing precedent regarding political
restructuring, it might have avoided the confusion exploited in Equality
Foundation. It might, furthermore, have strengthened the credibility of
Hunter and Seattle School District so as to discourage the Ninth Circuit
from searching for ultimately insignificant differences between these cases
and Coalition for Economic Equity rather than deciding the latter according
to its obvious congruities.
III. THREE VIEWS OF DEMOCRATIC EQUALITY
Although democratic formalism remains an informative outlying
principle, traditional process theories of equal protection have outworn their
initial luster. Under the competing procedural view of deliberative
politics,"°°  political deliberation must sometimes avoid resolving
controversial issues too conclusively in order to "enable diverse people to
live together." "0 This is the vision of liberal democracy that optimistically
interprets gag rules as democracy-reinforcing. The deliberative view rejects
the equation of democracy with strict majoritarianism construed as a "mere
statistical affair." ' 2 Furthermore, it rejects the view that politics is
ultimately reducible to a play of "strategic interaction." 103 However, it does
100. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287-328 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (discussing
deliberative politics as a procedural theory of democracy); David Gauthier, Constituting
Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 314, 320 (David Copp et al. eds., 1993) (describing
deliberative politics as a procedural view "establishing standards or conditions of interaction from
which all benefit").
101. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 21, see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 430 (2d
ed. 1996) (stating that "the deliberative conception of democracy... restricts the reasons citizens
may use in supporting legislation to reasons consistent with the recognition of other citizens as
equals"); Gauthier, supra note 100, at 319 (stating that in deliberative politics the constitution is
expected to answer "what are the optimal conditions under which the members of a society may
interact for their mutual advantage and to express their equal respect?"); Holmes, supra note 18.
at 20 (stating that a properly formulated gag rule can "profitably shift attention away from areas
of discord" and so disencumber the democratic process); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness:
Political Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 231 (1985) (stating that the objective of
deliberative public agreement depends upon the implementation of a "method of avoidance").
102. Sunstein, supra note II, at 37.
103. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument:
The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 293 (1989) (arguing that
deliberative politics refers to an "attitude toward social cooperation" requiring "openness to
persuasion by reasons," in contrast to a mere "strategic outcome represent[ing] not a collective
judgment of reason but a vector sum in the field of forces"); see also Gauthier, supra note 100, at
322-23 (arguing that democratic constitutions serve the deliberative function of controlling and
redirecting the strategic dimension of everyday politics).
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sometimes justify avoiding discussion of issues that might threaten the
smooth functioning of democratic institutions, even if the determination to
do so may also be a consequence of political power.
In Part V, I will introduce an alternative argument for a fundamental
commitment to democratic equality, focusing upon concerns for how the
reallocation of political power may impose special disabilities upon
minority groups. It is first necessary, however, to explore the prevailing
paradigms in order to understand what deficiencies must be overcome.
A. Between Democratic Formalism and Process Perfection
As discussed above, democratic formalism possesses the virtue of
granting broad discretion to actions receiving the support of a democratic
majority." Judicial decisions made according to this principle uphold
actions based on the legitimate exercise of majoritarian authority and tend
to favor clear but select substantive limitations to the exercise of that
authority."05 Democratic equality under formalism merely requires that all
groups submit to the presumptive neutrality of ruling by numbers.
It would be inaccurate to suggest that formalism cannot be moderated
sufficiently so as to acquire a centrist role in constitutional jurisprudence.
Deference to the democratic process will sometimes require that courts
ratify strategic conduct by a legitimate majority."° Even justices who have
voted against formalist outcomes in the restructuring cases have not
condemned majoritarian decisions purely on the grounds that they were
executed strategically rather than through the exercise of public reason."
104. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. For this reason. formalists also tend to
grant less discretion to decisions made by governmental institutions that are neither representative
in nature nor maintain some direct connection to the electorate. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 309 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (arguing that -isolated segments
of our vast governmental structures are not competent to make ... decisions [regarding the
remedial use of racial classifications], at least in the absence of legislative mandates and
legislatively determined criteria").
105. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J.. dissenting) (insisting
that the precedent of Bowers v. Hardwick, upholding the constitutionality of anti-sodomy laws as
applied to homosexuals, establishes that the Colorado electorate was not substantively precluded
from enacting an anti-gay constitutional amendment); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458
U.S. 457, 498 n.14 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court's decision was
illegitimate because it could not be construed to limit special protection to the right of racial
minorities to mandatory busing); cf. Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1. 413 U.S. 189, 219-20
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that if a school district is
substantively prohibited from maintaining a segregated school system, then it should be so
restricted regardless of whether such segregation is de jure or de facto).
106. See, e.g., Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (upholding the
constitutionality of a state constitutional amendment repealing mandatory busing as a judicial
remedy for de facto school segregation); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding the
constitutionality of a state constitutional amendment requiring that the development of low-
income housing receive prior approval through local referendum).
107. See supra Section II.B (discussing restructuring cases).
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Strict formalism, however, is deficient as a theory of equal protection
because it only reticently takes into account the fact that majoritarian
decisions may suffer from constitutional defects.
Theories of process perfection attempt to take such defects into
account. Expanding upon Justice Stone's famous theory of judicial review
in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,i' s John Hart Ely
has constructed a process theory under which courts are authorized to
intervene when representative government has malfunctioned so
substantially as to render the democratic process "undeserving of trust." 09
Professor Ely developed his theory from Justice Stone's intuition that
"prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition""' causing a defect in the political process whenever
governmental acts contain invidious purposes or refer explicitly to suspect
classifications." ' Thus, under process theory, democratic equality requires
that effective political participation be extended across the pluralist
spectrum of social groups by principled judicial intervention in order to
counteract legislative malfunctions.
Rather than using the Constitution antidemocratically to compel
morally desirable outcomes, Ely preferred that courts should target
legislative malfunctions for special scrutiny as a way of "'flushing out'
unconstitutional motivation." 1i2 Like formalism, however, process
perfection has become hobbled by vexing doctrinal rigidities that
sometimes lead courts to sacrifice common sense in favor of consistency." '
108. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). In footnote four, Justice Stone set forth three categories of
legislation for which the presumption of constitutionality might be eroded, including laws
violating explicit constitutional guarantees, laws "restrict[ing] those political processes which can
ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," and laws "directed at
particular religious, or national, or racial minorities." Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). Stone
argued most notably that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities." Id.
109. ELY, supra note 12, at 103.
110. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
11. Following Justice Stone's suggestion, Ely interprets prejudice to distort fatally the
ordinary workings of pluralist politics. See ELY, supra note 12, at 153 ("We are a nation of
minorities and our system thus depends on the ability and willingness of various groups to
apprehend those overlapping interests that can bind them into a majority on a given issue;
prejudice blinds us to overlapping interests that exist in fact.").
112. Id. at 146. By establishing prejudice as a process defect, Ely circumvents the problem of
hypothesizing forbidden outcomes and preserves the ideal of judicial deference that continues to
define constitutional jurisprudence. In this respect, his theory attempts to avoid the pitfall of
converting constitutional law into an open forum for extra-constitutional principles of moral
philosophy. See John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering
Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 33-39 (1978) (repudiating an inclination among his
contemporaries to seek constitutional values in works of moral philosophy).
113. Professor Jed Rubenfeld has argued that equal protection no longer satisfies its cardinal
function, because current doctrine has substituted an unprecedented cost-benefit analysis for the
process-perfecting function of "smoking out" invidious purposes. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative
Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997). This new analysis, however, is at least in part the
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Furthermore, contemporary restructuring cases provide additional problems
for process perfection. First, the status of direct democracy under process
theory is unclear, because "the people" may be entitled to a certain
measure of imperfection in the direct expression of their legislative
preferences. Second, strategic choices are not devalued unless they result in
process malfunctions. Yet it is unclear whether repeal through restructuring
should incur judicial distrust in order to preserve a deeper democratic
commitment to equal participation.
B. Deliberative Democracy and the Method of Constructive Avoidance
Liberal democratic theory acknowledges the utility of allowing the
people to bind themselves against possible future commitments and against
permitting the project of self-governance to come to grief over strong,
moral disagreements concerning public values and the appropriateness of
their expression through government." 4 The deliberative-politics paradigm
hypothesizes that democratic objectives can be both reinforced and
facilitated by occasionally undemocratic means. John Rawls describes such
means collectively as a "method of avoidance" ' necessary to extend
democracy beyond mere procedural commitments to an ideal of social
cooperation and consensus. Nevertheless, the same constitutional
protections interpreted by the process school to compensate for legislative
malfunction can be reinterpreted under a deliberative model as barriers
against the ratification of strategic outcomes in politics."
6
1. The Judicial Method of Avoidance: Decisional Mininalism
Courts may deploy the deliberative paradigm through the use of
"decisional minimalism." Professor Sunstein defines the term as "the
phenomenon of saying no more than necessary to justify an outcome, and
leaving as much as possible undecided." "" The principle of decisional
consequence of the Supreme Court's attempt to decide equal protection cases according to a rigid
principle of consistency that interprets racial classifications as producing stigmatic harms
regardless of whether the group classified is a majority or minority, dominant or disfavored, and
therefore to apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications regardless of whether they are
intended to be remedial. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200. 230 (1995); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
114. See Holmes, supra note 18; Stephen Holmes, Preconmitment and the Paradox of
Democracy, in CONSTIrtTIONALISM AND DEMOCRAcY, supra note 18. at 195; see also RAWLS,
supra note 101, at 430-31; Rawls, supra note 101,at 226-31.
115. Rawls, supra note 101, at 231.
116. See Sustein, supra note 11, at 8 (stating that constitutional process protections function
according to deliberative principles because "they serve to ensure against outcomes reached
without sufficient accountability and reflecting factional power instead of reason-giving in the
public domain").
117. 1&. at 6.
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minimalism places restrictions for deliberative technique directly upon the
courts. Sunstein argues that decisional minimalism "grants a certain
latitude to [nonjudicial] branches of government by allowing the
democratic process room to adapt."' If, however, the argument for
decisional minimalism is that it restrains the courts from usurping powers
of democratic discretion in the disposition of controversial issues, this is
still not an argument for minimalism across the totality of judicially
cognizable issues. For example, it does not explain why minimalism should
be practiced with regard to issues of political structure that are not socially
contentious. The crucial question here is whether political mechanisms
facilitating minority-disadvantaging strategic choices should be treated with
the same circumspection as the content of these choices themselves.
Sunstein's unassailable intuition is that jurists might agree about an
outcome, but not about the principles justifying that outcome; therefore, the
avoidance of those principles should facilitate agreement. According to his
interpretation of Romer, the decision represents an agreement between six
Justices that the particulars of the case justify an outcome, but not
necessarily an agreement about why. 1 9 However, to call Romer an example
of decisional minimalism under this definition may oversell its virtues.
Minimalism, in order to be an effective judicial technique, cannot be
practiced simultaneously across a broad range of adjudicative issues. 2 ' This
is precisely the rule that Romer violates. If political restructuring is
immaterial to the Romer decision, then it may be that its minimalism is
virtuous, but such a finding of immateriality is itself controversial. How can
the per se violation of equal protection be cast as a limitation on the right to
seek favorable legislation if the level of government at which one's right to
the legislation has been repudiated holds no significance? It seems,
moreover, that too cleverly practiced a form of judicial minimalism will
force a kind of derailing misdirection, by permitting particular adjudicative
principles to come into unnecessary conflict.
2. The Method of Avoidance in Lawmaking Institutions: Gag Rules
Within lawmaking institutions, such as institutions of direct democracy
and the legislature, the method of avoidance may take a form that is
potentially more structural and hence more tailored to the task of allocating
power through political arrangements. This second class of restrictions falls
under the general heading of "gag rules," though it comprises a variety of
institutions. In an influential essay, Stephen Holmes has identified a wide
118. Id. at 19.
119. Seeid. at21.
120. See id. at 25 ("Decisions are not usually minimalist or nonminimalist; they are
minimalist along certain dimensions.").
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range of gag rules that may be deployed in order to enhance democratic
governance. Holmes describes gag rules as "disencumbering strateg[ies]"
put in place by political agents upon their own structures of
self-governance.12 ' Gag rules function by blocking politically divisive
issues from entangling democratic processes, thereby allowing remaining
issues to be resolved through reason and compromise. Some notable
examples of gag rules include the Gag Rule of 1836,' preventing Congress
from raising the issue of slavery; the Establishment Clause, intended to de-
politicize religious conflict;'1 nonjusticiability doctrines, including political
question and standing; and amnesties.' 24
C. Preliminary Problems with Gag Rules
Holmes recognizes a distinction between gag rules that bar issues from
being deliberated in all democratic institutions under a particular
jurisdiction and those that bar their deliberation only in discrete
institutions.2 He observes that some gag rules "debar everyone from
raising a ticklish question [while] others are more narrowly targeted,
silencing only a selected class of speakers." " However, he does not
elaborate from this distinction which gag rules are democracy-enhancing
and which are distortive. His broad list of gag rules elides the analytic
problem that certain structures bar particular substantive areas of decision
within a particular institutional context (or in all contexts) and so can
depend for their justification on drawing a rational connection between
subject matter and a likelihood of decisional impasse, while other gag rules
remove specific parties from the decisionmaking apparatus." The latter
tactic may or may not be related to improving the deliberative process. For
example, standing doctrine prevents particular parties from raising a claim
of legal right that may nevertheless exist as a matter of positive law and be
available for use by other parties. When a party is thus prevented from
121. Holmes, supra note 18, at 23-24.
122. See id. at 31-35. See generally WILUIAM LEE MILLER. ARGUING ABOUr SLAVERY
(1996) (discussing the history of the Gag Rule of 1836).
123. See Holmes, supra note 18, at 43-50 (discussing the Establishment Clause as a means of
containing political divisiveness).
124. For a more comprehensive list, see id.
125. See id at 25-26; see also id. at 30-31.
126. Id. at 26.
127. Holmes's failure to be clear on this matter is exacerbated by the space that he appears to
leave open for equating political parties with forms of gag rles because they may tend to be
constituted through primordial or prepolitical solidarities (such as class, religious, or ethnic
affiliations). See id. at 29-30. Certainly not all political institutions that exclude certain kinds of
participants can be placed under the general heading of gag rules, especially if gag rules are
defined precisely in terms of their purpose to construct opportunities for rational debate. Holmes,
however, declines to draw such a bright fine.
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adjudicating a claim of right, it is prevented not only from securing
available remedies, but also from shaping that right for future cases.
Gag rules of this type tend to distort rather than disencumber
democracy by violating the principle of equal participation in the process of
self-rule. For the same reason, it is important to ascertain (a) whether the
exclusion of certain subject matters from democratic consideration should
be barred when it has the effect of driving identifiable groups from the
deliberative table, since they will no longer be able to vindicate their
specific interests through the democratic process; or (b) whether this effect
can sometimes be deemed a legitimate consequence of properly followed
procedures for collective self-rule. Holmes provides no guidance in these
areas, and, to a certain degree, his enthusiasm for gag rules as
disencumbering strategies reflects a comparative analysis in which they
appear crucially important for emerging democracies."8 Perhaps "mature"
democracies have a greater threshold for disagreement as a result of the
solidity of their political power-sharing arrangements or extra-political
factors, such as wealth and the patterns of its distribution. Unfortunately,
Holmes does not specify whether we should expect that a democracy at a
certain stage in its life should not resort to gag rules in order to avoid the
challenges of moral disagreement. This question intensifies when a society
has grown to reject the use of gag rules in certain kinds of cases (for
example, slavery and racial discrimination), but does not reject them in like
cases as they emerge (for example, gay rights).
Finally, tools of judicial review sometimes include gag rules. For
example, the Romer Court's prohibition against a bare desire to harm
subordinate groups could be interpreted as a forbidden interest rule."9 Such
a rule places a structural brake upon a majority's potential inclination to
wield political power according to its prejudices; but its applicability is as
narrow as governmental motivations are elusive. Alternatively, the Court
could have decided Romer according to a mandatory rule that required acts
of higher lawmaking to provide "a just framework" 13 for groups to engage
in pluralist politics. Under such a rule, state governments might be
compelled to defend acts of political restructuring with a showing that they
promote democratic inclusion by enhancing the participatory effectiveness
of minorities. 13  However, this application would far exceed Justice
128. See id. at 28-30 (discussing amnesties). See generally AREND LUPHART, DEMOCRACY
IN PLURAL SOCIETIES (1977) (comparing pluralist democracies).
129. But see Green, supra note 30, at 476 (arguing that it is unclear exactly what the
forbidden interest in Romer might be). For an explanation of how forbidden interest rules function
in equal protection jurisprudence, see id. at 469-72.
130. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
131. See Green, supra note 30, at 475 (describing such a rule as "moderate" when compared
with the alternative that governments demonstrate their adherence to a just framework even where
no act of restructuring has occurred). It should be noted that this argument is the structural
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Harlan's meaning in Hunter, where he argued that the government's duty to
provide a just political framework would be satisfied where the reallocation
of political power took place according to neutral (that is, non-invidious)
principles.13 2 It would also exceed the Court's ruling in Romer, since the
Court at no point invites Colorado to rebut the inference of discriminatory
animus by showing that Amendment 2 actually functions to broaden
participation. Nor has the Court suggested in any restructuring case that a
burden of justification shall transfer to the governmental defendant without
a showing that the act under review effected a policy repeal as well as a
reallocation of political power. Unfortunately, the theory of democracy-
enhancing gag rules does not determine in particular instances which sort of
rule we ought to pick or even what sort of interpretation to give an
established rule.
IV. A FOURTH ViEw: ROMER' S COMMITMENT To PRECLUDE SPECIAL
DISABILITY THROUGH POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING
A. Romer Reconsidered
As discussed above,' Justice Kennedy's majority opinion relies upon
two arguments: a weak argument that Amendment 2 fails the equal
protection challenge because, even under rational review, government
cannot constitutionally base its policies upon "a bare... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group,"' 3 and an ambiguous argument that it fails
because it violates a per se rule against "impos[ing] a broad and
undifferentiated disability on a single named group." "3 Justice Kennedy's
first line of argument is weak because the means of divining animus are
woefully unclear. Kennedy claimed that the amendment's "sheer breadth is
so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that [it] seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affects." " He has thus
suggested that the lack of factual support to justify rational relatedness is
equivalent to a finding of illicit motivation.'37
Viewed optimistically, the Romer Court may have laid the groundwork
for an inquiry into the social consequences of law that is not triggered by
correlate of Sunstein's claim, discussed above, that governments might be permitted to
discriminate against homosexuals only if they could affirmatively establish that their reasons were
public-regarding. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
133. See supra Section Il.A.
134. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996) (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno.
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
135. Id. at 632.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 634 (describing the inference of discriminatory motivation as "inevitable").
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findings of deficiency in the political process.138 It seems improbable,
however, that this was its intention because, if it were, robust inquiry into
the social consequences of lawmaking ought to be appropriate under
equal protection regardless of the level of scrutiny deployed or the use
of political restructuring. Under such an interpretation, the Court would
appear to have argued that majoritarian preferences are insufficient to
sustain minority-disadvantaging outcomes unless accompanied by reasons
justifying strategic behavior. 3 9 It seems more prudent, however, to interpret
Justice Kennedy as having inquired into the social controversy surrounding
Amendment 2 because it culminated in a broadly disadvantaging act of
political restructuring.1
40
Justice Kennedy's second argument regarding per se equal protection
violation is ambiguous because future courts cannot be sure when to apply
it. Kennedy claimed that Amendment 2 confounded the conventional model
of means-ends equal protection review. Amendment 2 was anomalous,
according to Kennedy, because it "identifie[d] persons by a single trait and
then denie[d] them protection across the board." "' Kennedy leaves unclear
whether the targeting of homosexual persons for disadvantageous treatment
on the basis of their sexual status was a sufficient condition to constitute per
se violation, or whether an additional structural component must attach. If
the former condition is sufficient, then this appears to be a justification for
separating Romer from the Hunter doctrine.
138. In a manner uncharacteristic of conventional rationality review, Justice Kennedy appears
to endorse a searching inquiry into the social contest in which Amendment 2 functions to isolate
and subordinate homosexuals. See id. at 623 (remarking upon the "contentious campaign"
through which Amendment was enacted); id. at 626-27 (discussing at length the statutes repealed
or diluted by the amendment). If indeed this is his approach, then it would be far more at odds
with the discriminatory purpose doctrine of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). than the
limited acceptance of impact analysis in the political restructuring cases. In other words, the use of
searching social inquiry to identify animus is a much broader judicial power than the use of
impact analysis to determine whether a facially neutral act of political restructuring in fact
targeted a minority group.
139. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text (discussing Professor Sunstein's view).
140. Thus, Justice Kennedy's opinion reminds us that there exists a crucial distinction
between rejecting the view that politics is ultimately reducible to a legitimate play of "strategic
interaction" and arguing positively that judges cannot review political actions without an
understanding of how they culminate to a "vector sum in the field of forces." Michelman. supra
note 103, at 293.
141. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. If this were the sole meaning of Kennedy's per se rule, then it
would equal Professor Akhil Amar's arguments for why Amendment 2 violates the spirit of the
Bill of Attainder Clause. Amar reminds us that the Bill of Attainder Clause was originally
intended to protect social groups against attempts by government to stigmatize and punish them
specifically. See Amar, supra note 11, at 218. Amar explains that "the sociology and principles
underlying the Attainder Clause powerfully illuminate the facts of Romer," and thus reminds us
that government cannot single out particular social groups and nominate them as outlaw castes
through its laws. Id. at 203-04. Amar's observations are insightful in that they point to a
meaningful distinction between Romer and the racial restructuring cases. See infra note 146 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, they fail to illuminate all that Kennedy means by special




However, Kennedy does emphasize that Amendment 2 imposed a
"special disability" upon gays and lesbians in that it forbade them "the
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without constraint." ' As
Kennedy describes it, there is an asymmetry and overbreadth in this
political disability because "no matter how local or discrete the harm, no
matter how public and widespread the injury," ' seeking protection in all
cases requires seeking a remedy through state higher lawmaking. Both the
logic and language of special disability echo the Hunter Court's touchstone,
"special burden." " Moreover, the Romer Court seems implicitly to regard
homosexuals, like African Americans, to be the kind of minority that is
vulnerable to subjugation through political disability because its interests
are socially stigmatized.4 5
What then is the salient structural difference between Amendment 2
and the provisions examined by Hunter and its progeny? In the earlier
cases, the offending provisions executed classifications based upon the
impartial category of race, and not upon the suspect classification of
particular racial statuses. Amendment 2, by contrast, employs a
classification based upon the partial category of homosexual, lesbian, and
bisexual statuses.'6 Amendment 2 exemplifies an especially pernicious
kind of political restructuring because, by explicitly naming the minority
targeted for disadvantage, the majority can fully insulate itself from the
consequences of its political attack. In other words, an impartial category
would be overinclusive of the target minority, causing some of the cost of
retrenching the minority's civil and political rights to be paid by the
majority. For example, if whites should find that protection against racial
discrimination is indeed in their interests, or if heterosexuals should find
that protections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in
fact have some utility for them, then either group might support
142- Romer, 517 U.S. at 631 (emphasis added).
143. Ie
144. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
145. Justice Kennedy observes that protection on the basis of sexual orientation-rather than
homosexuality-constitutes a valued gain in the interests of homosexuals to obtain legal
protection and a dis-valued gain for heterosexuals who act as though the protection contributes
nothing to their feeling of social or political security. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 630-31.
146. To make this distinction clear, my use of "partial" and "impartial" relies upon an
analogy of part to whole. Acts of restructuring, for example, might repeal laws granting protection
against racial discrimination or laws granting protection to a particular racial group, such as
African Americans. The former would deploy an impartial category (" race"). and the latter would
deploy a partial category ("African Americans"). It should also be noted that impartial here does
not mean fair or neutral, for certainly racial considerations will affect some groups more
consistently and directly than others. Nor is this distinction intended to illuminate conventional
equal protection doctrine, apart from cases involving political restructuring. Rather. the distinction
is useful for considering how Amendment 2 differs from the initiatives considered in Hunter and
Seattle School District insofar as it constitutes a per se equal protection violation.
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withdrawing "special" protections from blacks or from homosexuals while
leaving more general protections intact.
B. The Meaning of Special Disability
That Amendment 2 was a constitutional amendment and not simply
several movements to repeal a variety of city ordinances was crucial to the
Romer decision. The use of political restructuring gave the Court an
opportunity to define a new per se rule against any majority's explicit
targeting of particular groups for political disadvantage. This rule is a
natural consequence of the Court's disapproval of special disabilities that
might prevent minority groups from seeking policy benefits without
constraint, a disapproval originating with the Hunter doctrine.'47
However, the prohibition against special disability is confined in
application to acts of political restructuring. In this sense, it alms to restrain
majorities from entrenching political and social hierarchies by reallocating
political power, without imposing limitless justificatory burdens upon state
and local governments. For example, as discussed above, 48 neither Romer
nor Hunter proposes a mandatory rule under which governments must
establish that reallocations of power promote political inclusion.
Furthermore, the prohibition against special disability through political
restructuring does not rely upon a broader fundamental right to political
participation. Unlike the Colorado state court,14 9 neither the Romer nor
Hunter Courts proposed a fundamental interest in political participation that
would define the level of scrutiny appropriate to review political
restructuring. 50 Rather, the prohibition against special disability reflects the
Court's evolving understanding that the manipulation of political power
raises equal protection questions when it has the practical effect of
disadvantaging vulnerable minorities.
V. RECONSTRUCTING THE RESTRUCTURING DOCTRINE
JMirgen Habermas has written that "[a] reconstructive sociology of
democracy must ... choose its basic concepts in such a way that it can
identify particles and fragments of an 'existing reason' already incorporated
in political practices, however distorted these may be." ' To this
147. See supra notes 54, 74-79 and accompanying text.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 130-132.
149. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282-84 (1993) (supporting a fundamental
right to equal political participation).
150. Cf James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (declining to extend the Hunter doctrine to
protect low-income residents against disadvantageous political restructuring under the theory that
such restructuring infringes upon a fundamental right of political participation).
151. HABERMAS, supra note 100, at 287.
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reconstructive end, I have attempted to examine constitutional democracy
as a structural entity and to criticize the reification of its most fundamental
structural component: the majority. Holmes's structural account of
democratic restraints provides a useful means of interpreting democracy as
a system, but the normative justification of gag rules has proven insufficient
to explain the nature of the systemic failure represented by political
disability as discussed in cases like Romer and Hunter. This Part will
therefore deploy the prohibition against imposing political disability as a
possible alternative reason that can be used to gather Romer and the Hunter
line of cases together into one coherent doctrine. It will posit that these
cases reveal a deep democratic commitment to preventing political
structures from burdening identifiable social groups through a coordinate
form of political and social disability. It will attempt to develop this
commitment across an initial stage of doctrinal reconstruction, setting aside
the arguably more contentious second stage for future elaboration.
A. The First Stage
1. Why Restructuring Matters
The first step in this reconstruction must be to debunk the notion that
majorities should enjoy a presumption of legitimacy drastically
overpowering our concern for democratic equality, moderated only within
extremely narrow substantive parameters (that is, that the right of the
majority is absolute unless the minority enjoys a specific right to equal
treatment or has suffered the infringement of a fundamental right). Direct
democracy encourages romantic deference toward majorities, for through it
the people express themselves in a way that makes their preferences and
interests appear transparent. However, as I have protested above, a majority
is not a majority is not a majority.' 52 In fact, it seems more accurate to say
that "the people" are a function of the means of their expression.
5 3
What do Hunter and Romer reveal about democratic equality? They
reveal that democratic equality will be advanced against disadvantaging
practices of political restructuring by first analyzing the specific ways in
which this restructuring reconstitutes or entrenches power: from the
structural, or political, to the social. Thus, in Romer, the Court should first
have interpreted Amendment 2 in its structural capacity as a gag rule.
Amendment 2 qualified as a gag rule because it removed the issue of
152. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
153. Cf. Iris Marion Young, Deferring Group Representation, in ETIINIcrrY AND GROUP
RIGHTS 349, 359 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds.. 1997) ("The ideal of representing the 'will
of the people' presumes, that 'the people' exist prior to and independently of the process of
representation .... ").
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protection on the basis of gay and lesbian status from the deliberations of
all governmental institutions, except through the most remote apparatus of
the statewide initiative. As a matter of popular sovereignty, Amendment 2
performed a strong functional role of recommitment to the ideal of
proscribing legal protections for gays and lesbians on the basis of their
sexual status and possibly also to the ideal of expressing moral disapproval
for homosexual lifestyles. Amendment 2 permitted a majority of state
voters to vest themselves with the authority to intercede in procedures and
policies of local governance in order to effect an outcome that appears to
have only a symbolic relation to their own interests.
Because Amendment 2 operated at the jurisdictional level of the state, it
performed the following structural functions: (1) It bound legislators and
other state agents, including those within state subdivisions, against the
influence of powerful municipal governments, national interest groups, or
residents of the state (including especially gays and lesbians) that tend to
favor legal protections of the sort proscribed. (2) It bound future selves qua
future popular sovereigns under this proscription, pending further
amendment of the state constitution. (3) It specifically subverted the
political equality of gays and lesbians by precluding them from pursuing
political satisfaction of their specific interests in laws protecting them
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and instead
required that they first undertake to generate the broad statewide agreement
necessary to overturn the constitutional proscription.
Functions (1) and (2) are legitimate exercises of majoritarian power, if
we leave to one side the content of the constitutional provision. It is within
the authority of the popular sovereign to recommit itself and its agents, and
to do so may in fact enhance democracy even as it creates new hurdles for
future recommitment. The reasons for invoking structural functions (1) and
(2) matter when considering their compatibility with specific expressive
functions. For example, if the popular sovereign claims to have bound itself
and its agents against considering a particular issue outside of the
amendment process because that issue is so contentious that it might
otherwise bring individual democratic institutions to grief, this reason is not
compatible with the reason to express moral disapproval."' 4 The former
justification for invoking (1) and (2) contains an admission that democratic
154. In Romer, the state did in fact argue that part of the amendment's purpose was to deter
factionalism and to preserve the integrity of the state's political process. See Evans v. Romer, 882
P.2d 1335, 1339-40 (Colo. 1994) (en banc). The trial court explicitly denied that the political
purposes of deterring factionalism and preserving the right of Colorado citizens under the Tenth
Amendment to amend their state constitution could be considered compelling. The trial court
concluded that the interest in deterring factionalism was in fact no more than an attempt to restrict
the expression of "a difference of opinion on a controversial political question." Id. at 1340
(quoting the Colorado district court). It seems apparent, however, that deterring factionalism
should qualify as a legitimate interest under rationality review.
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institutions have been rendered incompetent by this issue, not that they have
been wayward in their expression of a particular viewpoint concerning the
issue and are now in need of correction.
By contrast, function (3) must be balanced against other political and
expressive purposes. We should consider whether the utility of
disencumbering gag rules outweighs the structural disadvantage that they
impose upon identifiable minorities. Instances where this would be
appropriate would be rare, but they may occur in times of great social strife.
In such circumstances, however, the significance of preserving the integrity
of the democratic process must be balanced not only against the structural
harm of special political disability but against collateral expressive harms as
well, which no doubt will compound this disability.'55 For this reason, such
acts of restructuring should be met with a more exacting standard than mere
rational basis scrutiny.
Under the facts of Romer, it is nearly impossible to imagine how the
issue of gay rights could so fracture society as to threaten to bring
democracy itself to grief, unless, of course, one decides to hold a
referendum on the morality of gay lifestyles. Ordinarily, it will be the case
that recommitment at a higher level of government is not necessary to the
goal of recommitment itself, for majorities do retain the right to repeal laws
they grow to disfavor. The question is whether that right is generalizable to
a right to repeal at a higher form of government. Because certain majorities
will be constituted only superordinate to the level at which offending
legislation is passed, we must recognize that the majority has constituted
itself structurally by the choice of constitutional recommitment. In other
words, majorities are not organic entities in the world, but they inhere in
particular political processes. By choosing the process, the majority chooses
and defines itself. Therefore, it is appropriate to weigh the interest in
recommitment against the special disability that it imposes upon an
identifiable group, precisely because a majority does not have a singular
moral content apart from its choice as to how specific commitments might
be enacted and enforced.
Finally, Amendment 2 functioned as a gag rule in that it caused a
restructuring of the normal political process. The structural function of the
amendment was inextricable from its targeting of gays and lesbians as a
partial social-status category. It would seem to be uncontroversial that gag
rules formally excluding specific parties from political fora should be
particularly suspect. 5 6 The Hunter doctrine extends this insight by
155. In the case of Romer, evidence of a contentious initiative process cannot be considered
evidence of political and social strife sufficient to warrant the creation of the political disability,
because the effort to create the disability is precisely the source of contention.
156. But see Holmes, supra note 18, at 26 (arguing that laypersons might Icgitimately be
excluded from collective decisions requiring technical expertise).
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recognizing that laws precluding the consideration of subject matters
especially relevant to an identifiable social minority should also be suspect
because of the special disability that they impose upon minority
participation.
Part IV of this Note posited that there is a meaningful distinction
between restructuring provisions that involve classifications employing
partial group-based categories (such as African Americans or gays and
lesbians) and classifications according to impartial categories (such as race
or sexual orientation). Part IV explained that the use of a partial category in
Amendment 2 may shed light on the Supreme Court's decision not to
follow the Hunter doctrine. Nevertheless, the flaw in the majority opinion is
that it so alienates the Hunter doctrine as to occlude the fact that Romer is
its limit case. This is the case because Romer involves burdens- to an
identifiable social group through the use of a partial rather than an impartial
category. 57 Romer on this point constitutes a per se application of the
Hunter doctrine: While Hunter applied strict scrutiny when confronted with
an impartial act of political restructuring that disadvantages a particular
minority (such as on the basis of sexual orientation), Romer held per se
invalid a partial act that did the same (but on the basis of sexual status).
2. Application
This reconstruction of equal protection doctrine could potentially
stabilize a presently spiraling area of doctrinal development. As discussed
above, ambiguities in the Romer majority opinion have contributed to the
Sixth Circuit's controversial Equality Foundation decision. 58 In Equality
Foundation, the Sixth Circuit found constitutional Article XII, an
amendment to the city charter of Cincinnati prohibiting the city and its
public agencies from enacting or enforcing any ordinance or policy "which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation ... entitles, or
otherwise provides a person with the basis to have any claim of minority or
protected status." ' On remand from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit
distinguished Romer, arguing that the two cases "involved substantially
different enactments of entirely distinct scope and impact, which
conceptually and analytically distinguished the constitutional posture of the
157. In this sense, Amendment 2 involved a more primitive kind of gag rule than the
provisions reviewed by the Court in Hunter and Seattle School District. This is likely to be the
case because the crafters of Amendment 2 saw nothing inherently illegitimate in targeting gays
and lesbians as a social group, while no doubt they would have if the amendment had targeted
blacks.
158. See supra Section I.C (discussing how the doctrinal ambiguity of the Supreme Court in
Romer promoted the Sixth Circuit's misapprehension of Romer's meaning).




two measures."61 It is here that Justice Kennedy's ambiguous rejection of
the Hunter doctrine has teeth. Hunter itself invalidated an amendment to a
city charter;, Romer's neglect of Hunter removes it from the circuit court's
view of germane precedent. Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit distinguished
Amendment 2 from Cincinnati's Article XII by stating that the latter "could
not dispossess gay Cincinnatians of any rights derived from any higher
level of state law" and thus could not render them "virtual
non-citizens. . without legal rights under any and every type of state
law." 161
Under reconstructed equal protection doctrine, after acknowledging
Article XII's restructuring characteristics, the Sixth Circuit should have
identified its anti-gay content as invoking a partial social-status
classification, thereby instantly triggering Romer's per se rule. One might
object that if Article XII had been intended as a global repeal of affirmative
action policies benefiting gays and lesbians, it should not be called a per se
violation simply because it invoked their partial social group status. I
disagree. It should violate equal protection just as the repeal of a school
district's authority to effect a desegregation plan through mandatory busing
violates equal protection. 62 The fact that there is no constitutional
obligation for either the city or the state to provide the repealed benefit does
not justify the removal of a benefit from a specific minority group through
an act of political restructuring that introduces obstacles to its future
achievement of similar protections.
A similar rationale can be applied to the Ninth Circuit's Coalition for
Economic Equity case. Proposition 209, an amendment to the California
Constitution, provides in relevant part that "[t]he state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or
group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the
operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting."163 The district court granted an injunction against the
amendment's enforcement, finding that it was not narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling governmental interest." The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that strict scrutiny did not apply because Proposition 209 invoked no
explicit racial classification nor could its repeal of race and gender
preferences be construed as a non-neutral act impermissibly burdening a
political minority."
160. Equality Foundation I1, 128 F.3d 289, 295 (6th Cir. 1997).
161. Id. at 296-97.
162. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
163. Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 696 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting CAL
CONST. art. 1, § 31(a)).
164. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
165. See supra Section I.C (discussing the formalist aspects of the Ninth Circuit's decision).
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The Ninth Circuit appealed to recent Supreme Court precedent
regarding the constitutionality of race-based public affirmative action
programs in order to determine (a) that the repeal of such programs in and
of itself does not amount to a racial classification or otherwise trigger
heightened scrutiny, and (b) that heightened scrutiny under equal protection
is triggered only by the use of suspect classifications.' 66 Thus, the circuit
used recent Supreme Court precedent to redefine which acts of restructuring
should qualify as racial classifications triggering heightened scrutiny under
Hunter and Seattle School District. The court concluded that because the
repeal of race and gender preferences should be interpreted as a facially
neutral policy for constitutional purposes, the use of political restructuring
to bring about that repeal was irrelevant in that the Hunter doctrine
determined that an act of restructuring triggers heightened scrutiny only
when it violates "neutral principles." 167
By placing questions of classification before a consideration of just
how Proposition 209 constitutes an act of political restructuring, the Ninth
Circuit lost sight of the relevant conception of neutrality. Laws are neutral
and therefore free from heightened scrutiny under Hunter, not because they
fail to invoke suspect classifications in the conventional sense, but because
they do not restructure the political process in order to impair the
achievement of policy objectives benefiting an identifiable minority.
Proposition 209 constitutes a "suspect category" of legislation under
Hunter because it removes traditional decisionmaking authority over racial
matters from subordinate levels of the state government to the higher and
more general level of the statewide initiative. 168 Under the reconstructed
Hunter doctrine, if Proposition 209 had specifically barred preferences for
blacks and Latinos, it would have triggered the per se rule established in
Romer by resorting to a partial categorization in order to identify precisely
those minorities that would suffer a special disability. In its present form,
Proposition 209 should elicit strict scrutiny under the long-established
Hunter doctrine, whereby it can be defended only through evidence that it
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.
166. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 702-708 (arguing that the question of
whether a repeal of affirmative action represented a non-neutral policy should be determined
under the recent precedent of Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). and City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).
167. Compare id. at 707 ("When... a state prohibits all its instruments from discriminating
against or granting preferential treatment to anyone on the basis of race or gender, it has
promulgated a law that addresses in neutral-fashion race-related and gender-related matters."
(emphasis added)), with Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 394 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)
("The existence of a bicameral legislature or an executive veto may on occasion make it more
difficult for minorities to achieve favorable legislation; nevertheless, they may not be attacked on
equal protection grounds since they are founded on neutral principles." (emphasis added)).




In summary, Romer and Hunter do not propose discontinuous equal
protection doctrines. Rather, their distinction is based upon the presence of
partial or impartial categories of social-status classification as part of the
restructuring provision placed under judicial review. Whenever an
identifiable social group claims to have experienced a special disability as a
consequence of political restructuring, courts should first ask whether the
provision employs a partial or impartial social-status category in order to
determine whether the per se rule of Romer is available." If so, then
adjudication can follow the model established by Romer, without concern
for whether the restructuring constructively disables a particular group by
impacting its interests. If the categorization is impartial, then the court
should refer to the Hunter doctrine in order to determine the availability of
heightened scrutiny. It is irrelevant under either standard whether the
repealed benefit was constitutionally required. The only attendant question,
to be pursued at a second stage of developing this reconstructed doctrine, is
whether the complaining group is the kind of group that can suffer a
coordinate form of social and political disability as a result of the social
stigmatization of its identity or interests.
B. The Second Stage: For Whom Restructuring Matters
This Note has focused primarily upon the first stage of equal protection
reconstruction after Romer. describing why restructuring matters in
defending minority groups against the imposition of special political
disabilities. But the elaboration of structural considerations at the first stage
raises a series of questions that must be addressed at a later stage of
doctrinal development. These questions fall under the general heading of
for whom restructuring matters.
For example, the use of partial or impartial categories by the
restructuring law determines whether the per se rule or heightened scrutiny
(or neither) is available to the reviewing court. The above application
assumes that the groups deserving protection against special disability
include at least racial minorities and homosexuals, since these are the
groups protected under Hunter and Romer. But the question remains
whether they should be protected in exactly the same way. In other words,
perhaps gays and lesbians deserve protection against the use of partial
categorizations burdening their interests in the political process, but not
against the use of impartial categorizations since these require an inquiry
into the practical effect of the restructuring law.
169. The latter case may include no explicit category at all. as in Initiative 350 reviewed in
Seattle School District.
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I disagree with this view. As discussed above, the Romer Court did in
fact assess the practical effect of Amendment 2 when inferring from the
latter a motivation of discriminatory animus.170 In addition, the commitment
to preclude the establishment of special disabilities for groups participating
in the political process is not limited to racial minorities after Romer, nor is
there any apparent reason for the synthesis of cases that do not rely upon
suspect classification to result only in the protection of groups that can be
identified by the conventional criteria of suspect classification. Notable
efforts have been undertaken to expand the range of groups protected under
suspect classification by introducing the powerful claim of homosexuals to
protected status.1 71 However, the present rationale would expand the list of
groups protected without recourse to the traditional criteria of suspect
classification but only against the effects of political restructuring. As
discussed above, the restructuring cases constitute a unique area of equal
protection in which the commitment to preclude special disability suggests
that protection should extend to all identifiable minority groups whose
social stigmatization and subordinate status make them vulnerable to
coordinate forms of social and political disability. 72 Therefore, the repeal of
protections based on the impartial category of sexual orientation should
receive heightened scrutiny (whether strict or intermediate constitutes yet
another, second-order question) because gays and lesbians are vulnerable to
political attack in a way that should spark judicial concern that their
interests not be unjustly burdened by manipulation of the democratic
process.'73
170. See supra notes 138-140 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 8, at 729-30 (arguing that the Carolene standard of
discreteness and insularity is insufficient to determine whether homosexuals deserve protected
status, because it is their anonymity that produces additional organizational costs and so increases
their relative political powerless); Yoshino, supra note 7, at 509-38 (arguing that standards of
immutability and invisibility are similarly insufficient to explain why homosexuals deserve
constitutional protection).
172. See supra Section V.A.
173. Like the busing cases of the 1980s, school voucher programs may provide an interesting
heuristic device for assessing how this reconstructed doctrine might evolve. For example, the city
of Milwaukee currently operates a parental choice voucher program (the Milwaukee Parental
Choice Program, or MPCP), permitting parents to use public funds to pay their children's tuition
at private schools, including religious schools. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the
MPCP does not violate the Establishment Clause, and the United States Supreme Court has
declined to hear the case on appeal. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998). cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). In the 1995-1996 school year, religious institutions constituted 89
of the 122 private schools eligible to participate in the program. See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619
n. 17. It is conceivable that opponents of the MPCP may decide that the state court was premature
in approving the program's constitutionality. These opponents may view the Christian Right in
particular as a religious minority with disproportionate power in both national and local politics.
They might, therefore, sponsor a state constitutional amendment repealing the authority of
municipalities to provide vouchers transferable to religious schools or to private schools in general
except under special circumstances (such as those relating to a student's disability). Certainly
either amendment would restructure the political process in such a way as to burden the interests
of religious groups. While the first permutation (barring religious schools from participation in
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Second, a single act of political restructuring may repeal policies
benefiting several distinct social minorities that, when considered
collectively, in fact constitute a voting majority within the relevant
jurisdiction. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit accepted the district court's
findings that Proposition 209 impaired the interests of insular minorities
within the state of California. However, the court of appeals considered in
dicta that racial minorities in the aggregate may constitute a numerical
majority, thus appearing to frustrate the restructuring precedent.'7 In
Hunter, for example, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he majority needs
no protection against discrimination." '75 The Hunter and Seattle School
District Courts had considered the effects of political restructuring against a
single minority group that constituted a clear numerical minority within the
jurisdiction. These cases most likely did not anticipate that
minorty-disadvantaging restructuring could be effectively deployed in a
multi-racial jurisdiction. Therefore, future courts will likely be compelled to
decide whether the prohibition against burdening minority interests is
triggered only when the affected minority constitutes a numerical minority
within the jurisdiction (thereby virtually ensuring that women as a group
will never receive Hunter protection); or whether the protection of minority
interests attaches to the interests themselves rather than to the numerical
status of the minority group.
In other words, it may be the case that certain interests held by
minorities are so socially stigmatized and therefore so vulnerable to
political disapprobation that they can scarcely be defended by a numerically
strong minority, even one with coalition opportunities that could bring its
interests to majoritarian status. If, as in the case of affirmative action, these
are the kinds of interests that spoil coalitions, then even coalition groups of
similarly interested minorities may reject the pursuit of such interests in
order to achieve other political goals.' 6 The question then for the
voucher programs) would undeniably be open to challenge under the Free Exercise Clause, it
should also be open to equal protection challenge. Arguably. the first permutation invokes a
partial categorization opening the amendment to challenge under the per se rule. This seems to be
the case because, even though the amendment does not name a specific religious group for
disadvantage, it does target religious groups as opposed to non-religious groups. The second
permutation, like the anti-busing amendment in Seattle School District, uses an impartial
classification which nevertheless possesses the practical effect of disadvantaging a minority
group. We may debate whether the consequence of this political attack is sufficiently diffuse as to
impact a variety of religious and non-religious groups and, therefore, withhold the application of
heightened scrutiny. Nevertheless, the primary significance of this example is to demonstrate that
groups other than homosexuals and racial minorities may require additional protection against
political restructuring in order to ensure that they are not branded with special political
disabilities, as majorities grow tempted to access strategically those political mechanisms through
which they can most effectively concentrate their political power.
174. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1997).
175. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
176. See FRYMER, supra note 14, at 31-32 (explaining that the coalition-of-minorities model
works poorly when organized around racial issues).
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reconstructed doctrine is whether political structuring should be permitted
to be the mechanism that forces this kind of conflict within minority groups,
with no special judicial protection emanating from the fact that the
restructuring has occurred precisely in order to ban the disfavored interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to reconcile Romer v. Evans with prior
doctrine developed in the course of constitutional challenges to acts of
political restructuring that adversely impacted African Americans. Gays
and lesbians have been injured by a pervasive resistance to acknowledging
the structural parallels between their political experiences and those of
traditionally protected minorities. This Note has attempted to overcome this
resistance by erasing the artificial barrier erected between Romer and the
Hunter doctrine by the Romer Court's omission of relevant precedent. The
structural considerations of this Note were intended to distill from this
reconciliation a core democratic commitment, enforceable under the Equal
Protection Clause, to preclude social minorities from being burdened with
special political disabilities.
Although it has not been the purpose of this Note definitively to answer
whether suspect classification should be enlarged to include sexual
orientation or whether homosexuals constitute a suspect class under equal
protection, the Note has argued three points that should influence the
reconstruction of the Romer and Hunter doctrine at a second stage: that
those acts should be held constitutionally suspect that place minority groups
in a condition of special disability; that a group so impacted will deserve
heightened judicial protection; and that the Romer Court appeared to
believe that homosexual persons are capable of representing this kind of
group. For some readers, the structural considerations of this Note may
have accomplished little more than the framing of persisting questions. I
have considered this, however, to be a worthwhile task.
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